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Rethinking ideation: a cognitive approach of innovation lock-ins 
AGOGUE, Marine; LE MASSON, Pascal 
 
Abstract: Some industries are lacking the proposal of truly original new ideas to 
renew existing products and/or services, despite repeated efforts from all 
stakeholders to make innovative and original proposals. These situations, called 
orphan innovation, lead to revisit the contemporary approaches to the study of 
obstacles in ideation, as orphan innovation is a paradoxical situation. 
Conventional financial constraints and institutional level are released, the market 
demand is strong, niche strategies are possible and bold entrepreneurs abound. 
And yet, the proposals do not fulfil expectations regarding innovation. 
We advocate in this paper that cognitive sciences can contribute to making sense 
of this phenomenon. Based on recent studies in cognitive psychology on idea 
generation, we propose a model of ideation reasoning, contrasting heuristic-based 
reasoning and exploration-based reasoning. We then apply this model on a case 
study, showing how a cognitive model of ideation allows to diagnose orphan 
innovation and more generally innovation lock-ins. 
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1  Introduction 
The generation of new ideas is a key element in any innovation process (Tidd & Bessant 
2000). Radically new products and new services are not designed without a prior 
exploration of novel ideas that break with the dominant logic in the organizational field 
(Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum 2009). However, when a cognitive paradigm becomes 
dominant, it can prevent the generation of new ideas, block innovation and then lead to 
what design literature as called “fixation” (Janson & Smith 1991, Purcell & Gero 1996, 
Agogué et al 2013). Fixation is a blind and sometimes counterproductive stickiness to a 
limited set of ideas during the generation of new ideas. An important challenge for 
innovation research is thus to understand how novel ideas can be generated and 
implemented even when fixation occurs. The answer to this question may illuminate 
ways in which we can proactively stimulate the generation of new ideas, and thus 
promote innovation. 
To illustrate the difficulties that occur during idea generation, we take an example 
from the field of elderly care in France. In this field, one way to innovate is to build on 
information and communication technologies that assist seniors. In the coming decades, 
France will, like many other western countries, face significant challenges related to the 
aging of its population. The number of French citizens above the age of 75 is expected to 
reach a total of 10 million people in 2040, of which approximately 1.2 million people are 
expected to be dependent upon social programs. According to current trends, most of 
these seniors will want to remain in their homes until the end of their lives. However, 
despite the wide recognition of the financial and human resource challenges that this 
demographic development presents, innovative proposals for how to address them have 
been surprisingly slow to manifest. One of few innovations developed for this population 
 is the ability to supervise a person with loss of autonomy in his or her residence via high-
technology devices. For instance, a medallion linked to a telealarm system can trigger a 
remote alarm and activate sensors that detect if a person has made a fall and then initiate 
a rescue operation if needed. For the past fifteen years, a variety of such devices have 
appeared on the market, but none of them have until now achieved commercial success. 
Interviews with users tend to reveal that these devices reinforce a stigma related to age 
and disabilities: being designed “for elderly people”, they do not fit with how the targeted 
user groups (mainly the elderly) perceive, or would like to perceive, themselves. In 
addition, these technologies do not entirely resolve the problem of providing assistance to 
seniors as most devices trigger an alert but do not prevent the accident from occurring. As 
a result, this type of innovative proposals has not been very successful. In general, the 
capacity for innovation among actors in the field of elderly care remains weak compared 
to societal expectations, and all the innovative efforts are aligned within the same class of 
ideas, that is the ability to supervise a person with loss of autonomy in his or her 
residence via high-technology devices.  
A situation in which society expects many innovative proposals but no actors 
produce them has been labelled as orphan innovation situation (Agogué, Le Masson & 
Robinson, 2012). In such a situation, even if numerous actors are mobilized to propose 
solutions, few novel ideas are generated and few substantially new products and services 
come to market, let alone succeed commercially. Orphan innovation is therefore a 
paradoxical situation. Financial and institutional constrained are released, the market 
demand is strong, diverse actors are committed, niche strategies are possible and bold 
entrepreneurs abound. And yet, the proposals remain disappointing in terms of innovation 
compared with expectations. Understanding this paradox actually requires to examine the 
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cognitive mechanisms of idea generation outside known paradigms. If different social 
science steams, such as path-dependence literature, highlight the existence of cognitive 
mechanisms as part of the innovation process, these theoretical approaches do not open 
the black box of the idea generation per se and do not provide evidence to clarify the 
issue of orphan innovation. Part of the explanation for orphan innovation may lie with 
cognitive lock-ins that reduce the capacity of actors to generate and support ideas that 
deviate from existing paradigms. An important question is therefore how novel ideas can 
be stimulated. We explore this topic from an endogenous viewpoint, namely that of 
individuals‟ ability to deviate from existing paradigms. 
The argument we advance in this paper contains a theoretical component and an 
empirical component. The paper is organized as follows: we first review existing 
literature on innovation lock-ins and ideation difficulties. We then bridge to cognitive 
science to propose and discuss a cognitive model of ideation to diagnose orphan 
innovation. We present an illustration of this model on an orphan innovation case to 
highlight the managerial implications of this cognitive approach of ideation, and to 
underline how an analytical model of ideation also helps to propose managerial leverages 
to stimulate ideation in new directions in order to overcome orphan innovation. Breaking 
with the common assumption that individual creativity is constrained by collective 
mechanisms such as social conformity or inhibition, we conclude that there is a need 
today to rethink the collective action as leverage on the capacity of individuals to 
generate creative ideas. 
 2  Innovation lock-ins : the key-role of cognitive bias in ideation 
Various streams of research in management and organization theory sought to explain the 
causes of innovation staleness, in particular in order to better understand the 
organizational inertia and the impact of past events on the decision-making process. An 
explanation highlighted by the literature on the possible obstacles to innovation is the 
lack of knowledge and absorptive capacity (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005). Stakeholders in an 
industry may indeed not have the skills or resources to innovate, nor the required non-
local relationship to thrive (Camagni, 1991). On a more institutional level, the path 
dependence phenomenon has been studied for over 25 years (David, 1985). The concept 
of path-dependence was initially used to describe the fact that the long-term evolution of 
a system depends on its starting point and on potential hazardous events, meaning that 
past events condition future evolution, preventing new possible future to emerge. 
However, is the issue to understand why some innovation pathways are achievable or not, 
chosen or not, or is the issue more about understanding the inability of firms to propose 
new ideas, to explore new innovation paths? Indeed, the lack of knowledge and the path-
dependence approaches propose explanations to innovation blockages that are built on the 
underlying assumption that stakeholders have different options from which to choose to 
invest or not, and that those options are known, well-identified, and the blockage lies in 
the result of a decision based on certain criteria which are not necessarily promoting 
innovation. However, it is legitimate to assume that the options available already exist? 
That stakeholders have the capacity to generate all the possible options and that the issue 
is of decision-making? 
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2.1. Biased decisions in innovation activities: the path-dependence phenomenon 
Individuals and organizations tend to be biased in innovation activities. Literature on 
path-dependence has shown how historical events could influence the outcome of a 
stochastic process (Arthur 1989; David 1985; Meyer & Schubert 2007). Path-dependence 
describes the fact that the long-term evolution of a system depends on its starting point 
and on hazardous events incurred during its history (David, 1985; 2000). Thus, this 
concept describes the effects of past events on future developments (Sydow et al, 2009; 
Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995), and focuses on how certain technologies become standard 
even though their sub-optimality is proven. Today, the concept of path dependence is 
expanded in sociology and history to indicate how actors undertake decision due to past 
events.  
Moreover, economic literature points to the existence of certain rules or principles 
that impact industrial dynamics (Dosi 1982, Cohendet & Llerena 1993, Kaplan & 
Henderson 2005). These rules may limit the capacity of stakeholders to explore 
alternatives to the existing paradigm, extending the notion of path dependence to the 
notion of cognitive path dependence (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Thrane, Blaabjerg, & 
Møller, 2010). Kaplan and Tripsas (2008) argue indeed that the uncertainty inherent in 
the nature and trajectory of a new technology requires economic actors working on this 
technology to make sense of the situation before acting. These studies clarify how actors 
select ideas within a collective cognitive framework around a dominant technological 
trajectory. Thrane and colleagues (2010) stress that this collective cognitive framework 
can lead to constrain the exploration of alternatives, which can be interpreted as cognitive 
path dependence, i.e. confinement in a privileged way of innovation because of a shared 
vision. These cognitive factors supplement the purely economic and institutional path-
 dependence of the approach, realizing complementary interactions between actors around 
these cognitive frameworks, shared or not. 
Research on path-creation introduces agency into the picture, arguing that 
entrepreneurs can intentionally deviate from existing ideational structures (Garud & 
Karnoe, 2001). Actors engage in experimentation and exploration as they probe into the 
world as it is being created (ibid: p. 8). Garud and Karnoe moreover stress that deviating 
from existing frames, i.e. deframing, implies appreciating cognitive embeddedness in 
order to depart from existing representation in mindful ways. In other words, to be able to 
think "outside of the box", we must already know where the box is. However, the 
mechanisms that lead individuals to create new paths remain unarticulated. 
2.2 Bridging to cognitive science 
Being a discipline studying individual reasoning and development, cognitive psychology 
seems well equipped to study bias at the individual level of analysis. The study of 
cognitive bias is at the heart of work in cognitive psychology, which has contributed to 
identify systematic deviations from normative models in multiple areas: probability 
judgment and decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), deductive and inductive 
reasoning (Frederick, 2005, Kahneman & Tversky, 1972);social relations (Drozda-
Senkowska, 1999), etc. 
Research examines, for instance, the effect of framing on decision-making 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). This research highlights how individuals can be biased in 
their decision-making when the frame describing the options changes. The authors 
explored how two different phrasings affected participants' responses to a choice in a 
hypothetical life and death situation. In the experiment, participants were asked to choose 
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between two treatments, A and B. Treatment A was chosen by 72% of participants when 
it was presented with positive framing („it will save X lives‟) dropping to only 22% when 
the same choice was presented with negative framing („Y people will die‟).  
2.3 Alternatives Generation: Fixation effect in cognitive psychology 
When it comes to idea generation processes per se, recent studies show how individuals 
tend to generate ideas based on spontaneously activated knowledge (Smith, Ward & 
Schumacher 1993; Agogué et al. 2013). This process activates creative reasoning along 
the path of least resistance (Ward, Patterson & Sifornis 2004). According to these studies, 
individuals use existing elements to generate new ideas, leading to fixation effects. 
Cognitive fixation during idea generation refers to a body of work that helped to clarify 
the obstacles that most people are likely to encounter in creative situations (Abraham & 
Windmann, 2007, Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 1993, Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995; 
Jansson & Smith, 1991); it characterizes fixation effect as a spontaneously activated 
knowledge in creative tasks that constrains further explorations.  
Agogué and colleagues (2014) have demonstrated that the ability to generate new 
ideas could be constrained. From the "task of the egg," in which subjects must design a 
way to ensure that a hen's egg dropped from a height of 10 meters does not break, the 
authors examined how individuals are fixed on the same solutions when asked to generate 
the most creative solutions as possible. Around 80 percents of the answers given are on 
the following categories: that is to say “damping the shock”, “protecting the egg” and 
“slowing the fall”, which are quite classical. The authors argue that two different 
reasoning systems seem to compete: the use of cognitive routines (called heuristics), that 
push individuals to take the path of least resistance in order to propose already known 
 solutions (or not very creative) and the use of expansive reasoning to explore alternatives 
outside of fixation effect. Besides, research starts to explore today factors that allow to 
shift from on system of reasoning to another. Typically, some studies (Agogué et al 2013) 
show that the introduction of an example can impact the competition between the two 
systems, as classic examples tend to reinforce the activation of heuristics, while 
disruptive and original examples support creativity and the exploration of new solutions.  
3  Towards a cognitive model for the management of ideation 
Cognitive science studies can then help shed light on the cognitive processes that 
occur during ideation and that can constrain or stimulate the generation of truly new 
ideas. Essentially, individuals tend to activate heuristics and shortcuts that are based on 
existing representations of known objects, leading to incremental creativity and fixation 
on classical solutions. This type of reasoning can be labelled as a Heuristic-based 
reasoning. Heuristics are short-cut mental strategies that streamline information (Nisbett 
et al., 1983). Heuristic-based reasoning in ideation accounts therefore for the tendency to 
maintain existing paradigms. Since others tend to share the same cognitive paradigm, we 
are unlikely to encounter opposition, questioning, or challenge from them, shifting to 
conformity (Ford, 1996; Smith, Ward & Schumacher, 1993). Such reasoning occur along 
the path of least resistance (Ward, 1994), therefore requires low cognitive resources and 
leads to the generation of elements of solutions that fit with the paradigm, bearing a low 
degree of originality. But another type of reasoning can be described as well, which built 
on the extension of the objects we are working on, on the expansion processes that bring 
knew knowledge in (Hatchuel, 2001). Thus, in Exploration-based reasoning, individuals 
engage in the controlled construction of expansions that challenges the existing 
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paradigms, potentially leading to new ideas and disruptive, innovative solutions. 
Exploration-based reasoning allows generating original and rare ideas but requires a 
controlled, costly slow process. Indeed, it takes more cognitive effort to generate multiple 
alternatives, suspend judgment, and look for originality than to reuse known solutions 
(Shalley & Gilson, 2004). Table 1 outlines some of the core features of the two types of 
reasoning as they apply to idea generation.  
-------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------- 
4  Methodology: applying a cognitive model to orphan innovation 
4.1 Data selection 
We now give an example of how a cognitive model of ideation can help understand 
orphan innovation and enable to propose managerial levers on this situation. To do so, we 
present go back to the case presented in the introduction, that is, the ecosystem of new 
technologies that are designed to assist seniors in the Rhône-Alpes region (South of 
France). This ecosystem is in an orphan innovation situation: despite favourable 
institutional conditions and a strong societal demand for innovation, there appears to be a 
certain lethargy among the stakeholders regarding proposing new, disruptive, out-of-the-
box innovations. Indeed, the principal innovation that was developed over a fifteen-year 
period in this sector is the ability to supervise a person in their residence via high-
technology devices, but these innovations did not appear to encounter notable success.  
 4.2 Data collection  
We conducted an intervention research in the Rhône-Alpes region between Septembre 
2009 and July 2012. Intervention research aims to contribute to both practice and theory 
building (Shani et al., 2007; Radaelli, Guerci, Cirella & Shani, 2014; Hatchuel & David, 
2007). As such, a distinguishing feature of intervention research, differentiating it from 
other forms of qualitative method in management studies, is the deliberate involvement of 
the researcher in changes to the situation being researched (Coghlan, 2011; Huxham and 
Vangen, 2003). This was considered to be a suitable research design to study the different 
types of ideation reasoning, those being difficult to capture either in retrospect or through 
questionnaires.  
Our research initiated with the demand in 2009 of the cluster I-Care to study the staleness 
of the industry in terms of innovation. At the initiative of the director of the cluster, 
intervention-research began in September 2009 with an analysis of several projects on the 
subject of elderly autonomy. These projects were submitted to the cluster through a call 
for proposals in mid-2009. This initial analysis has identified gaps in the knowledge used 
by the industry, some of which can be listed as: 
• knowledge of the physical and mental condition of the elderly, their learning 
abilities or their perception of their own frailty, for example; 
• the diversity of the social system within which a person, taking into account the 
caregivers, care staff, relatives, neighbors, etc.. ; 
• issues of medical ethics, such as the issue of control at all costs, at the expense of 
individual freedom; 
• economic recovery devices in the healthcare market and / or market new 
technologies etc.. 
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A further study of the products and services available on the market confirmed that 
these shortcomings were not addressed yet. This analysis helped to establish the 
knowledge base necessary to start modeling the cognitive field frame. This knowledge 
map was then supported by interviews with various members of the group of players with 
the ability of the cluster to mobilize various stakeholders. For example, we met with 
geriatricians who point to emerging concepts in geriatrics, which guided the exploration 
of a new notion, the concept of fragility. 
Between 2009 and 2012, we met on a regular basis (at least once a month) for work 
sessions with the management of the cluster I-Care. We iteratively built a cognitive 
mapping of the different types of reasoning occurring within the industry, and came to a 
joint understanding with the manager of the cluster in regards with the heuristic-based 
versus exploration-based reasoning.  
4.3 Data analysis 
Based on the cognitive model of ideation reasoning described above, we propose to 
analyse our collected material based on the distinction between heuristic-based reasoning 
and exploration-based reasoning. To do so, we look at four dimensions: the nature of the 
cognitive paradigms shared among the field, the nature of the existing objects and/or 
projects, the nature of the key-words used in the field and the genesis of generated ideas 
in on-going projects. 
 Table 2 synthesizes the matrix used to analyse the collected data. 
-------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------- 
 5 Findings: diagnosing and acting on orphan innovation 
This work resulted in the construction of cognitive mapping, which showed a very strong 
effect of fixation effect around the monitoring of the elderly people, whereas alternatives 
remained unexplored. This modeling showed that the innovative proposals are not 
adapted to the needs of users, are difficult to use, and stigmatize age and handicap. The 
question of acceptability is a crucial point. Further, current projects do not entirely 
address the issue because most devices trigger an alert in the case of an incident but do 
not prevent the accident from occurring. In addition, there are various obstacles beyond 
the question of users‟ acceptability, including the absence of a structured health market, 
difficulties in understanding and complying with regulations, and the need for 
prescriptions for the devices by medical personnel. Responding to the demand for 
innovation appears to challenge the innovation capacities that are in place and requires 
stakeholders to explore new ideas to address a new paradigm.  
The discussion that was initiated by the I-Care cluster with geriatricians and some 
readings has led to a more exploratory type of reasoning, leading to the discovery of the 
concept of fragility. The problem of autonomy can then be reformulated using this new 
concept (Fried et al., 2001). Fragility is described as an intermediate state between 
robustness and dependence. During this period of life, which affects, for example, a large 
proportion of seniors, the risk of falling or developing a disease is greater. Modeling 
fragility in this manner implies that an individual is only fragile in relation to the state of 
the environment in which he or she finds himself. Thus, an individual who has trouble 
seeing properly will have less difficulty seeing in a brightly lit room than in a dark room. 
Fragility is then defined by the hostility of an environment. 
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Table 3 synthesizes the modelling of both heuristic-based and exploration-based 
reasoning in the field of ICT for the autonomy of elderly in the Rhône-Alpes region in 
France. 
-------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------- 
Shifting from the concept of ICT for assisting the autonomy of seniors to the 
concept of fragility makes visible new interdependences among the actors as well as new 
actors to involve, and helps to understand the current staleness in the innovation 
processes. It is this new concept of fragility that allows us to characterize the relevant 
ecosystem in dealing with helping aging people. Thus, the actions of the cluster and the 
proposed conceptual broadening help to open the field to new stakeholders (e.g., in 
connection with fragility and the seniors‟ environment). Therefore, diagnosing ideation 
reasoning in orphan innovation is a first step in acting on overcoming such situation.  
Various actions performed by the cluster led to the appropriation of new alternative 
technologies by all of the ecosystem‟s stakeholders and engendered new modalities of 
interactions among these stakeholders. For instance, from mid 2010, the I-Care cluster 
has progressively developed new types of activities to tackle the cognitive difficulties 
diagnosed. One of the first steps was to build a common representation with a network of 
stakeholders through dedicated seminars. The stakes of some seminars were not as much 
about providing a detailed view of the field of autonomy for elderly people as exploring 
new sides of the question. It started with the elicitation of the limits of different heuristic-
based reasoning in order to allow a collective awareness of the cognitive difficulties and 
to stimulate the shift to a more exploration based mind-set.  
 5 Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we argue that the study of innovation lock-ins in the innovation process 
requires a better understanding of cognitive biases at individual and collective level, to 
understand situations like orphan innovation where very stabilized cognitive routines lead 
a group of actors to stick with ideas within a dominant paradigm. This study of cognitive 
biases in the phases of ideation must focus in part on a consideration of the mechanisms 
of adoption and resistance to spontaneous activation of existing cognitive routines, and 
secondly on a reflection on the possible forms of collective action that can restore 
individual capacities when they are constrained by the activation of cognitive routines 
that have a low creative potential.  
5.1 Expanding dual process models 
Recent studies from cognitive science (Agogué et al 2014) have underlined the need 
to distinguish between two types of reasoning that are activated during ideation: (1) a 
fixated reasoning building on the use of cognitive routines using existing solutions within 
a stable paradigm and (2) a more explorative reasoning that lead to propose more creative 
ideas. We have therefore proposed a dual model of ideation reasoning, contrasting 
heuristic-based reasoning and exploration-based reasoning. Heuristic-based reasoning 
accounts for the tendency to maintain existing paradigms, when individuals tend to 
activate heuristics and shortcuts that are based on existing representations of known 
objects, leading to incremental creativity and fixation on classical solutions. Since others 
tend to share the same frame, we are unlikely to encounter opposition, questioning, or 
challenge from them. On the other hand, in exploration-based reasoning, individuals 
engage in the controlled construction of expansions that challenges the existing 
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paradigms, potentially leading to new ideas and disruptive, innovative solutions. 
Exploration-based reasoning allows generating original and rare ideas. 
Our model points out that during the production of original ideas, an individual is 
naturally biased and activate spontaneously existing cognitive routines preventing truly 
novel solutions to emerge. This notion of cognitive routine recalls the work of 
evolutionary economists (Nelson and Winter, 1982). However, cognitive science research 
invites to broaden the perception of cognitive routine not only as an observing and 
understanding mechanism, but also as a specific type of reasoning activated during the 
search for original solutions. And this activation is based on the rapid generation of 
solutions based on the existing knowledge (existing solutions), which make it more 
difficult to explore new opportunities, leading an individual to lock on solutions that are 
only variations of the same routines without offering originality. 
Our model extends the dual process model proposed to understand decision-making 
and problem-solving (Kahneman, 2011). Making a bridge with cognitive science is a 
similar dynamic to that which led to a dialogue between economists and psychologists on 
decision-making. Indeed, mutual borrowing between the humanities and cognitive 
sciences are not new. The work of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) helped to deepen the 
understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that can lead to bias reasoning. Yet, creative 
reasoning remains out of the scope of such interdisciplinary dialogue, despite the 
potential such cognitive model bear for the study of innovation and creative processes. 
5.2 The role of public actors as middleground to overcome cognitive lock-ins 
 Based on an intervention-research approach, our findings also suggest that 
innovation policy can lay a role in helping an industry shifting in terms of ideation 
 reasoning. The cluster represents indeed a new managerial figure who supports the 
diagnosis of orphan innovation and leads an industrial dynamics renewal policy from a 
cognitive lens. This is in line with the new dynamics described by Lefebvre (2013), who 
focused on the levers of cluster initiatives to boost innovation by stimulating the 
emergence of joint R&D projects. Yet, our findings bring a new aspect to research on 
cluster dynamics by stressing the importance for clusters to bridge between meta-levels 
and individual-levels in order to build cognitive diagnosis to support innovation and 
overcome lock-in situations. In that sense, we suggest that such cluster acts as a 
middleground (Cohendet, Grandadam & Simon, 2010) by enabling new knowledge to 
transit from an informal micro-level to a formal macro-level.  
Moreover, besides the public policy in place, the manager of the cluster had a crucial 
in focusing on diagnosing the cognitive routines embedded in the field. As stressed by 
Lobo and colleagues (2014) individuals are important to the innovative process, 
acknowledging non-endogenous factors of innovation performance.  
5.3 Perspectives 
Our findings open up interesting perspectives. First, experimental protocols can be 
interpreted as modeling the interaction between a subject and an experimenter, which 
models therefore the influence of an authority figure on the individual capacity to think of 
creative ideas. Such a reinterpretation of experiments in closed and controlled laboratory 
shed a fresh light at the influence of collective action during ideation. Indeed, studies 
(Shalley, Zhou & Oldham, 2004) have shown that some forms of interaction between a 
subject and an experimenter have a restraining effect on the number of responses made as 
well as the originality of the responses, while other forms of interaction have a beneficial 
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effect on the contrary on these dimensions. This underlines that some specific forms of 
collective action can support ideation activities and help individuals to overcome fixation 
and overcome orphan innovation.  
In addition, the results presented earlier raise the question of the role of collective 
action and its management to improve individual skills in generating creative ideas. Some 
types of collective action can stimulate individuals to generate and revise their 
organizational but also cognitive routines. Recent research (Chatterjee, 2014) also 
suggests that leader‟s cognitive style matters for idea generation. Many factors may 
influence creative reasoning, and it is therefore necessary to examine the forms of 
collective action that act on the individual's ability to generate new ideas.  
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Table 1 Cognitive model of ideation reasoning 
Heuristic-based reasoning Exploration-based reasoning 
Maintain existing paradigms Challenge existing paradigm  
Reuse known ideas Explore new original ideas 
Rapid process Slow process 
Automatic and spontaneous Controlled  
Require low cognitive resources  Require high cognitive resources  
Emergence of ideas that fit with 
existing paradigms 
Emergence of disruptive creative 
ideas  
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Table 2 Data analysis matrix for diagnosing ideation reasoning in orphan innovation 
 Heuristic-based reasoning Exploration-based reasoning 
Cognitive 
paradigms 
Explicating known stabilized 
paradigms  
Explicating emerging /conflicted / 
unstabilized paradigms  
Nature of projects Analyzing existing mainstream 
objects / projects 
Identifying objects / projects related 
to the problematic but considered as 
out the scope 
Key-words Identifying key-words and buzz-
words in current trends 
Identifying neologisms, new words 
imported from other domains 
Genesis of 
generated ideas  
Identifying the roots and the frame 
of classic known ideas 
Identifying emerging frames that not 
fit with existing frames 
 
  
Table 3 Diagnosing orphan innovation: the ICT for autonomy of elderly case 
 Heuristic-based reasoning Exploration-based reasoning 
Cognitive 
paradigms 
An older person needs to be 
monitored by products and services 
designed specifically for an old 
person  
Fragility (in relation to the state of 
the environment) is a state potentially 
temporary where a person has higher 
risk to become dependent 
Nature of projects Tele-alarm, tele-assistance, sensors 
monitoring the person movement 
New interactive objects fighting 
desocialization 
Key-words Risk detection, fall detection, assisted 
ambient living 
Fragility, enhanced environment, 
rehabilitation of interaction 
Genesis of 
generated ideas  
Elderly-people centered-monitoring 
aids 
Interaction-centered aids for fragile 
people in an hostile environment 
 
 
